Immediately after Standard & Poor’s rating agency announced its historic downgrade of US sovereign debt last Friday, China’s official Xinhua news agency published a scathing editorial, excoriating the profligate western nation for its “debt addiction”.

　　在評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾(Standard & Poor’s)日前宣布了調(diào)降美國(guó)主權(quán)債務(wù)評(píng)級(jí)這一歷史性決定之后，中國(guó)官方新聞機(jī)構(gòu)新華社立即發(fā)表了一篇措辭尖銳的社論，嚴(yán)厲抨擊揮霍無(wú)度的西方國(guó)家“借債成癮”。

　　“The US government has to come to terms with the painful fact that the good old days when it could just borrow its way out of messes of its own making are finally gone,” it thundered, as it reminded Americans that China was the largest foreign holder of their government’s debt.

　　文章斥責(zé)稱：“美國(guó)政府必須接受痛苦的事實(shí)，僅僅依靠舉債就能擺脫自己制造的麻煩的時(shí)代已經(jīng)結(jié)束了。”另外，它還提醒美國(guó)人，中國(guó)是他們政府債務(wù)最大的外國(guó)持有者。

　　The implicit assertion behind this fierce outburst was that China, in stark contrast to the US, was a country that understood “the commonsense principle that one should live within its means”.

　　在這種強(qiáng)烈的情感迸發(fā)背后，隱藏著這樣的主張：與美國(guó)截然不同，中國(guó)是一個(gè)懂得“應(yīng)量入為出這一常識(shí)”的國(guó)家。

　　Indeed, the Chinese central government’s declared gross debt was only about 17 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of 2010 – tiny when compared with the debt-to-GDP ratios for the US (87 per cent), UK (80 per cent) and Japan (210 per cent).

　　事實(shí)上，截至2010年底，中國(guó)中央政府公開(kāi)宣布的債務(wù)總額與國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之比為17%左右——與美國(guó)的87%、英國(guó)的80%以及日本的210%相比，可謂是微不足道。

　　S&P and its competitor Moody’s both upgraded China’s sovereign rating at the end of last year, with S&P citing Beijing’s modest indebtedness, a strong external asset position and the economy’s rosy outlook.

　　去年年底，標(biāo)普及其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手穆迪(Moody’s)均上調(diào)了中國(guó)的主權(quán)評(píng)級(jí)。標(biāo)普當(dāng)時(shí)給出的理由是，中國(guó)政府負(fù)債規(guī)模適中、外部資產(chǎn)規(guī)模龐大、經(jīng)濟(jì)前景樂(lè)觀。

　　But the Chinese government is not quite the frugal, prudent borrower it portrays itself to be.

　　但中國(guó)政府并不完全像它自己所描述的那樣，是一個(gè)勤儉、審慎的借款者。

　　When assessing a country’s real debt situation, rating agencies usually use a concept known as “general government” debt. This includes the liabilities of central and local governments as well as social security funds. Most debt ratios for developed economies such as the US are calculated in this way.

　　當(dāng)評(píng)估一個(gè)國(guó)家真實(shí)的債務(wù)狀況時(shí)，評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)通常會(huì)使用一個(gè)名為“政府負(fù)債總額”的概念。這包括中央和地方政府的負(fù)債，以及社會(huì)保障資金。大多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家（比如美國(guó)）的債務(wù)比率，都是用這個(gè)方式計(jì)算出來(lái)的。

　　In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, China’s local and regional governments went on an infrastructure building spree that saw them run up huge debts, usually channelled through special-purpose financing vehicles that allow them to get around laws requiring them to keep balanced budgets.

　　2008年金融危機(jī)后，中國(guó)的地方及地區(qū)政府紛紛大舉興建基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，并因此積欠了巨額債務(wù)。這些債務(wù)通常是通過(guò)特殊目的融資工具融資獲得，因?yàn)檫@些工具可讓他們繞過(guò)要求他們維持預(yù)算平衡的法律規(guī)定。

　　Various parts of the Chinese government have different estimates of the total size of local government debt, but one of the more authoritative figures puts it at about 37 per cent of GDP at the end of last year, according to the GaveKal-Dragonomics economic research firm.

　　經(jīng)濟(jì)研究公司龍洲經(jīng)訊(GaveKal-Dragonomics)稱，中國(guó)政府不同部門(mén)對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)總規(guī)模有著不同的估計(jì)，但一個(gè)比較權(quán)威的數(shù)字是：去年年底這些地方政府債務(wù)相當(dāng)于GDP的約37%。

　　By including a range of other liabilities that Beijing is explicitly or implicitly on the hook for – such as ballooning debt at the railway ministry, bonds issued by so-called policy banks that lend on behalf of the state, and bad debts in the state-owned banking system – GaveKal-Dragonomics estimates that China’s real debt-to-GDP ratio could be as high as 90 per cent.

　　龍洲經(jīng)訊估計(jì)，如果再將中國(guó)政府其它一系列顯性與隱性的債務(wù)——比如鐵道部容易膨脹的債務(wù)、那些代表國(guó)家放貸的所謂政策性銀行發(fā)行的債券、以及國(guó)有銀行體系中的不良債務(wù)——計(jì)算進(jìn)來(lái)，那么中國(guó)實(shí)際的債務(wù)/GDP比例可能高達(dá)90%。

　　Other analysts believe the total is more like 70-80 per cent, and Fitch Ratings makes a conservative estimate of about 48 per cent gross general government debt by the end of last year, based on the opaque and incomplete information available.

　　其他分析師認(rèn)為，總債務(wù)比例更有可能在70%到80%之間，惠譽(yù)評(píng)級(jí)(Fitch Ratings)根據(jù)可獲得的不透明、不充分的信息，做出了較為保守的估計(jì)：截至去年年底，中國(guó)政府負(fù)債總額約為GDP的48%。

　　The main point is that China’s debt burden is far higher than it likes to admit, and much of that debt has piled up in the past few years, as a result of Beijing’s response to the global financial crisis.

　　重要的是，中國(guó)的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出它所愿意承認(rèn)的水平，而且這些債務(wù)中大部分是過(guò)去幾年累積起來(lái)的，源自于中國(guó)政府應(yīng)對(duì)全球金融危機(jī)的舉措。

　　“Even though headline sovereign debt levels are low in China, so much quasi-sovereign activity happens through the banking system that if you include some of those contingent liabilities, the number can get very big,” says Charlene Chu, head of Fitch’s China Bank Ratings.

　　惠譽(yù)中國(guó)銀行業(yè)評(píng)級(jí)主管朱夏蓮(Charlene Chu)指出：“雖然中國(guó)整體主權(quán)債務(wù)水平較低，但是這么多半主權(quán)行為通過(guò)銀行體系發(fā)生，如果把某些或有債務(wù)包括進(jìn)來(lái)，數(shù)字就會(huì)十分巨大。”

　　“People forget that China undertook its fiscal stimulus package through the banking system rather than by issuing public debt in the way that other countries did.”

　　“人們忘了中國(guó)是通過(guò)銀行體系來(lái)實(shí)施財(cái)政刺激方案的，而不是像其他國(guó)家那樣，通過(guò)發(fā)行公共債券的方式。”

　　While government debt in China is definitely much larger than it appears at first glance, nobody is predicting an imminent debt crisis.

　　雖然中國(guó)的政府債務(wù)絕對(duì)比乍看上去的印象高出許多，但沒(méi)有人認(rèn)為債務(wù)危機(jī)正在臨近。

　　“With an economy growing at a nominal rate of 15 per cent, and tax revenues of around 26 per cent of GDP, China clearly has more firepower than, say, Greece,” says Stephen Green, head of China research at Standard Chartered bank.

　　渣打銀行(Standard Chartered)大中華區(qū)研究部主管王志浩(Stephen Green)指出：“中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)名義增長(zhǎng)率達(dá)15%，稅收收入約占GDP的26%，中國(guó)手中的火力顯然比希臘要強(qiáng)。”

　　Another key point is that China, like Japan, does not have large external debts that could spark a crisis if they were called in.

　　另一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素在于，中國(guó)和日本一樣，并沒(méi)有在需要償還時(shí)可能引發(fā)危機(jī)的大額外債。

　　In addition, China’s borrowing has mainly been used to fund infrastructure projects that will have future economic benefits for the country, whereas the US, for example, is borrowing huge amounts to pay for defence and social welfare programmes that don’t provide the same economic boost.

　　此外，中國(guó)借債主要用于籌集基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)資金，這在未來(lái)會(huì)為中國(guó)帶來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。而以美國(guó)為例，大舉借債是用于國(guó)防和社會(huì)福利項(xiàng)目，并不能給經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)同樣的推動(dòng)。

　　China’s fiscal picture is not quite as pristine as Beijing would have us believe, but surging growth rates cover up a lot of sins and the situation remains much worse in the west.

　　中國(guó)的財(cái)政狀況可能并不像中國(guó)政府希望我們認(rèn)為的那樣良好，但高速的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)掩蓋了許多弊端，況且西方的處境遠(yuǎn)比中國(guó)差得多。

　　That is why the official Chinese media are having a field day after years of sanctimonious lecturing from western capitalists, and why they feel confident enough to declare that “all Americans, both Beltway politicians and those on Main Street, have to do some serious soul-searching to bring their country back from a potential financial abyss”.

　　正因如此，中國(guó)官方媒體在西方資本主義者多年來(lái)的偽善說(shuō)教后，終于找到了機(jī)會(huì)反戈一擊。也因如此，它們覺(jué)得自己有足夠的信心宣稱，所有美國(guó)人，無(wú)論是華盛頓的政客還是普通百姓，都應(yīng)該認(rèn)真反思，才能把美國(guó)從潛在的財(cái)政深淵挽救回來(lái)。